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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID J. SMITH, FOR THE ESTATE 
OF SALLIE L. SMITH, LORETTA E., 
SMITH, FIDDLERS CANYON 
DEVELOPMENT, LTD., AND 
TRADERS INTERNATIONAL 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
CEDAR CITY MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appeal No. 20070501 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3 and UT. R. APP. P. 3(a) provides this Court's 
jurisdiction over this appeal from the Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
entered on April 14, 2007 (the "Dismissal Order"), by the Fifth Judicial District Court in 
and for Iron County, State of Utah, in this case concerning the trial court's dismissal of an 
Inverse Condemnation Action. A copy of the Dismissal Order is attached hereto as 
Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to properly convert the 
City's motion pursuant to UT. R. ClV. P. 12(b)(6) into a motion pursuant to 
Ut. R. Civ. P. 56 for summary judgment, effectively failing to give Smith 
reasonable notice or opportunity to submit other rule 56 materials before 
granting the motion? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whether the district court properly granted the motion 
to dismiss is 'a question of law, [which] we review for correctness, giving no 
deference to the decision of the trial court.9" Gunn v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 
2007 UT App. 4, Tf6, 155 P.3d 113, citing Peterson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 2002 UT 
App. 56, T[7, 42 P.3d 1253. "We will only affirm a trial court's grant of a motion to 
dismiss ' "where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of its claims." ' " 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shores, 2006 UT 393, f 14, 147 P.3d 456, cftwg Heiner v, S.J. 
Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109-10 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting Arrow Indus. V. 
Zions First Naf 1 Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). "In reviewing trial court 
order granting motion to dismiss for failure to state claim on which relief can be 
granted, appellate court must accept material allegations of complaint as true, and 
appellate court will affirm trial court's ruling only if it clearly appears complainant 
can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claims." Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2006 
UT App 340, f 6, 143 P.3d 295. 
ISSUE II: Did the trial court violate Appellants' due process rights under the 
United States and Utah Constitutions by first denying a motion to 
consolidate the case with a separate cause pertaining to the real 
property, then determining the underlying issue based upon the 
determination in that separate cause of action? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Constitutional issues, including that of due process, are 
questions of law which we review for correctness." State in Interest of K.M., 965 P.2d 
576, 351 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, U 1. 
ISSUE III: Did the trial court commit plain error in relying in its decision to 
dismiss the action upon the affidavit of Kit Wareham, Cedar City 
Engineer, in which Wareham attested to provisions of a contract, a 
copy of which was never provided by the City to the trial courf! 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The admissibility of an item of evidence is a legal 
question." Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 19, K 14, 17 P.3d 1110, citing Jensen v. 
Intermountain Power Agency. 1999 UT 10,1fl2, 977 P.2d 474. "[T]he trial court has a 
great deal of discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence, and its 
ruling will not be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion." Id. , citing Jensen at 
1H[12, 14; State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681, 
684 (Utah 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. Hintze's Utah Law of Eminent Domain, §11.15 
B. UTAH CONST. ART. I § 22 
C. UTAH CODE ANN. 17A-3-303(l)(a) 
D. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-9 
E.. UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-10 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Cedar City (the "City") entered condemnation property (the "Property") sometime 
in 1999 and began conducting soil tests. The City entered into a contract with Schmidt 
Construction ("Schmidt") to build the Fiddlers' Canyon flood control structure, which 
included a dam and retention basin (the "Structure"). Most of the materials used in 
constructing the Structure were obtained onsite. The materials consisted of various size 
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rock, some of which was used as riprap and some of which was processed in to various 
size materials as specified in the contract. 
At the time the contract was executed between the City and the contractor, Smith 
was the owner of the Property. The City constructed and completed the Structure on the 
Property in 2000. In 2001, more than a year after the Structure was completed, the City 
commenced the related action in Cedar City v. Smith, et ah Civil No.010500168 DC (the 
"Condemnation Action"), pertaining to the condemnation of the 7.5 acres that contains 
the Structure. 
The Condemnation Action sought title to the land involved but did not address the 
rock and gravel removed and utilized in the Structure. Smith filed a counterclaim in the 
Condemnation Action for inverse condemnation pertaining to the materials used in the 
Structure in the Condemnation Action, but said counterclaim was dismissed for lack of 
ripeness until the adjudication in that action resulted in a judgment not yielding just 
compensation. See, Condemnation Action, Memorandum and Order, dated April 1, 2005. 
On May 21, 2001, David J. Smith, for the Estate of Sallie L. Smith, Loretta E., 
Smith, Fiddlers Canyon Development, Ltd., and Traders International, (hereinafter 
collectively, "Smith") filed a Complaint in the Fifth Judicial District Court, under Case 
No. 010500355 for inverse condemnation pertaining to the rocks and materials that were 
utilized in the building of the Structure prior to the condemnation of the Property by the 
City (the "Inverse Action"). Both cases were set before the same trial court judge, Judge 
G. Michael Westfall. The Complaint alleged in the first cause of action that Smith was 
entitled to compensation for the materials used in the construction of the Special 
Improvement District (hereinafter "SID") which was constructed on his property. 
(Complaint, p. 3). In a second cause of action, Smith challenged the SID as invalid. 
In 2005, after mediation with the City in the Condemnation Action, Smith deeded 
to the City the Property upon which the Structure was built, but retained ownership of the 
surrounding portion of the property. No condemnation proceedings were ever 
commenced by the City with respect to the rocks and materials removed from the 
Property and surrounding areas to complete the Structure. Although scheduling of the 
Inverse Action revolved around the Condemnation Action, and several extensions and 
continuances were arranged and granted so that the Condemnation Action could resolve 
prior to a determination on the Inverse Action, the trial court denied Smith's motion to 
consolidate the cases. 
This appeal stems from the dismissal of the Inverse Action. In an order dated June 
9, 2006, a briefing schedule was set as to the pending causes of action1. (Stipulated Order 
Vacating Trial; Dismissing Plaintiffs Second and Third Causes of Action, p.2). Id. On 
or about July 31, 2006, Smith's Trial Brief'was filed indicating that, since the City had 
used materials in the form of rock and gravel in the construction of a flood control 
structure from the condemned property and adjacent property, that Smith was entitled to 
just compensation. The Trial Brief also indicated that the SID that had been constructed 
was invalid. (Trial Brief pp. 1-9). 
1
 Although the parties stipulated to a dismissal of the cause of action pertaining to the validity of the SID, the trial 
court acknowledged that neither party referenced such stipulation and presented full argument on said issue in their 
memoranda. Hence, the trial court opted to consider the claim in its final Judgment in this matter. See, Addendum 
"A." 
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On August 25, 2006, the City filed their Response to Plaintiffs' 'Trial Brief and 
Motion to Dismiss, arguing estoppel, claim preclusion, and issue preclusion. The City 
based their Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, supported by an affidavit sworn to by Kit Wareham. (Response to Plaintiffs' 
u
 Trial Brief' and Motion to Dismiss, pp. 1-16). Smith in turn filed the Plaintiffs Reply to 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' "Trial Brief and Motion to Dismiss on September 
12, 2006, which included a Statement of Facts supported by an affidavit sworn to by 
Frank Nichols. (Reply to Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' "Trial Brief and Motion to 
Dismiss, pp. 1-16). The City then filed a Motion to Strike certain portions of those facts 
and Smith responded in turn with a Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
Strike. (Motion to Strike, pp. 1-2; Response in Opposition of pp. 1-3). On October 3, 
2006, the City filed a Reply relating to their Motion to Strike. 
On November 13, 2006, the same court entered the Final Order of Condemnation 
in the Condemnation Action. In a review hearing held in the instant matter on February 
13, 2007, the City presented arguments to dismiss the Inverse Action based in part upon 
entry of the final order in the Condemnation Action. On April 14, 2006, the trial court 
entered the Dismissal Order, from which Smith now appeals. (Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss pp. 1-4). The Dismissal Order dismissed Smith's Inverse 
Action. Id. at 3. On May 14, 2007, Smith timely filed his Notice to Appeal from the 
Dismissal Order. (Notice to Appeal p. 1). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Complaint 
On May 24, 2007, Smith filed his Complaint in the above-captioned matter. In 
said Complaint, Smith alleged that, on or about June 6, 1999, the City initiated SID-98, 
which was a conglomeration of six (6) projects, each independent from the others and 
with the assessments within each project segregated and grouped according to the 
properties which purported to benefit from the work done within each project. See, 
Complaint at p. 2. One of the projects included in SID-98 was the flood control structure, 
the construction materials of which are at issue in this Inverse Action. Id. The flood 
control structure herein was designed and engineered by Bowen Collins & Associates, a 
Salt Lake City engineering firm hired by the City, and the estimated cost was in excess of 
two million dollars ($2,000,000.00). Id. 
Sometime during the Fall of 1999, the City entered into a contract for the 
construction of the flood control structure with Schmidt, who was the successful bidder 
of the project. Id. The contract identified the City as the owner of the real property 
where the flood control structure was to be built; however, the property was then owned 
by the Smith parties herein. Id. The contract provided that Schmidt could enter the 
property and construct the project using materials located on Smith's properties. Id. 
Schmidt was ultimately paid $819,361.15 on the contract, with total cost of the 
construction according to the City at $915,753.54 (including interest on interim 
warrants). Id. On April 24, 2001, the City enacted an ordinance assessing plaintiffs 
property. Id. 
B. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be 
Granted. 
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On October 3, 2006, Cedar City Engineer Kit Wareham ("Wareham"), swore in 
an affidavit that he contracted with Schmidt Construction to construct the SID in the 
instant matter. (Affidavit of Kit Wareham, Cedar City Engineer, p. 1). Schmidt 
Construction ("Schmidt") was hired to construct a flood control structure (hereinafter the 
"Structure") within the SID. Id. The construction of the Structure required rip-rap lining 
of the Structure's channel and rock lining for the dam and basin. Id. at 2. Wareham swore 
that the contract with Schmidt required Schmidt to provide the rock and other materials 
needed to construct the Structure and that, to the best of his knowledge, Schmidt did so. 
Id 
On September 25, 2006, managing partner of Fiddler's Canyon Development, 
LTD., Frank Nichols (hereinafter "Nichols"), a party to the above captioned case, swore 
by affidavit that the City entered the condemned property at issue herein and began to 
conduct soil tests in 1999. (Affidavit of Frank Nichols in Support of Reply to Defendant's 
Response to Plaintiffs' Trial Brief and Motion to Dismiss, p. 1). Nichols swore that, it was 
at this time that the City resolved to build the Structure, using rock and gravel located on-
site and from the adjacent property. Id. at 2. Nichols swore that the City completed the 
Structure in 2000, and since that time levied assessments against the adjacent properties 
for the SID. Id. Nichols swore that the City filed the Condemnation Action against Smith 
in 2001, a year after the Structure was completed. Id. Nichols swore that during 
proceedings for the Condemnation Action, the trial court "acknowledged in open court on 
the record as William L. Bernard [counsel for Smith in the Condemnation Action and 
herein] raised the issue and made statements several times in open court to the effect that 
the Court was limiting the condemnation issue to the value of land upon which the 
Structure was sited,55 which was 7.5 acres. Id. at pp. 2-3. Nichols swore that Smith did 
not authorize the taking of the materials used in the construction of the Structure and that 
compensation for the materials had not been provided to Smith. Id at 3. 
The City moved to strike Frank Nichols' affidavit, alleging that it contained 
unsupported claims and failure to assert a fact in one of the paragraphs. See, Motion to 
Strike, dated September 14, 2006. In support of said motion, the City alleged that the 
rocks were supplied by the private contractor, Schmidt, to satisfy their contract with the 
City, to which Wareham's aforementioned affidavit pertains. See, Reply to Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendant's Motion to Strike, dated October 3, 2006. The City further 
alleged that the elusive contract not provided to the parties or the trial court in this matter, 
". . .is explicit that the contractor is to furnish, 'all of the material, supplies, tools, 
equipment, labor and other services necessary for the construction and completion of the 
project described herein."9 Id. The City goes on to argue that, "[t]here is also a term in 
the contract whereby Schmidt Construction agreed to hold the City harmless from, 'any 
liability, damages or claims that may arise in the course of the Contractor, its agents or 
employees performing any activities in connection with said project, or resulting through 
negligence of the same.5" Id. The City then relies upon a deposition of Frank Nichols in 
which they claim he indicated he had a verbal contract with Schmidt for at least some of 
the materials used to construct the project. Id. 
In the Dismissal Order in this matter, the trial court acknowledged the filing of the 
motion to strike and the responses thereto, indicating that the City had supported its 
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position with the Wareham's affidavit. See, Dismissal Order at pp. 2-3. Specifically, the 
trial court indicated that, ". . .Wareham claims that the contractor on the project was 
obligated to provide the materials and, in fact, did provide 'all the rocks used as materials 
in the project that were not removed from the approximately 7.5 acre flood control basin 
constructed as part of the project.' That claim is unrebutted by any affidavit or citation to 
the record except the allegations of the Complaint and Plaintiffs' arguments against 
dismissal." Id. at p. 3. The trial court then denied the claim respecting compensation for 
materials located on the condemned property as failing to state a claim for which relief 
may be granted, referencing Smith's compensation in the Condemnation Action as 
inclusive of the materials taken from the condemned property. Id. As it pertained to 
materials taken from adjacent properties, the trial court found that the claim was 
unsupported by any affidavit or citation to the record, stating that ". . .Plaintiffs may not 
simply rely on the allegations in their complaint or their argument, unsupported by any 
affidavit or citation to the record, in opposing Defendant's motion for summary 
judgement [sic] as to that claim." Id. The trial court then granted "Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment of dismissal" as to the materials removed from adjacent property 
and dismissed the claim. Id. 
C. Dismissal of Cause of Action Regarding Validity of SID. 
In accordance with governing code sections, the Complaint was filed within the 
requisite 30-day time frame from such assessment on May 24, 2007. See, UTAH CODE 
ANN. §17A3-330. In the Complaint, the first cause of action was based in equity and 
justice requesting compensation for the materials used in construction of the project in 
the sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00), praying for judgment in the form of a 
setoff to the aforementioned assessment. See, Complaint at p. 4. The second and third 
causes of action, also based in equity and justice, challenged the validity of the 
assessment as being against properties not benefited by the structure and inequitable as to 
properties arbitrarily exempted from the assessment. Id. 
Although the parties entered into a stipulation to dismiss the second and third 
causes of action, the validity of the SID was briefed by both parties and the trial court 
accordingly addressed the arguments of the parties as to such. See, Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated April 14, 2007. In the City's Reply to Defendant's 
Response to Plaintiffs' 'Trial Brief and Motion to Dismiss, the City argued for 
dismissal based on the contention that ". . .plaintiffs [sic] have not alleged that they 
complied with the above cited provisions of UCA §17A-3-330 [sic], that would allow 
them to contest the assessment." Ibid, at p. 8. The action pertaining to the validity of the 
SID was dismissed by the trial court on the basis that the Complaint failed to allege 
compliance with the statutory provisions cited by the City in its Reply to Defendant's 
Response to Plaintiffs' 'Trial Brief and Motion to Dismiss. Ibid, at pp. 3-4. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
UTAH CONST. ART. I § 22 states, "Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation." 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
PROPERLY CONVERT THE CITY'S MOTION PURSUANT TO UT. R. CIV. P. 
12(B)(6) INTO A MOTION PURSUANT TO UT. R. CIV. P. 56 FOR SUMMARY 
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JUDGMENT, EFFECTIVELY FAILING TO GIVE SMITH REASONABLE 
NOTICE OR OPPORTUNITY TO SUBMIT OTHER RULE 56 MATERIALS 
BEFORE GRANTING THE MOTION 
A. The Trial Court Failed to Convert the Dismissal Motion into a Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
In a recent decision, this Court undertook a comparative analysis of the 
requirements of UT. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions for dismissal based upon failure to state 
a claim upon which relief may be granted, and UT. R. Civ. P. 56 motions for summary 
judgment on the pleadings. Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App. 10, 155 P.3d 893. It opined as 
follows: 
If a court considers material outside the pleadings in deciding a rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must convert the motion into one for 
summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). This rule 12(b) conversion 
process includes giving the parties reasonable notice and opportunity to 
submit all pertinent summary judgment materials for the court's 
consideration. See id; Hebertson v. Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 
1391 (Utah 1996); Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 
191, 193 (Utah 1977). The notice and opportunity to submit requirements 
are especially important with respect to the party against whom judgment is 
entered. See Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 (stating that the opportunity for the 
non-moving party to submit rule 56 material is particularly important). Our 
rules provide that complaints and answers constitute pleadings. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 7(a) (including replies to counterclaims and answers to cross-
claims, as well as third-party complaints and answers, within the definition 
of pleadings). A matter outside the pleadings "include[s] any written or oral 
evidence ... which ... substantiat [es] ... and does not merely reiterate what 
is said in the pleadings." Oakwood VilL, 2004 UT 101 at f 12, 104 P.3d 
1226 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
Id. at f 8. In Tuttle, the Defendant submitted copies with its memorandum respecting the 
dismissal issue of a federal judgment involving the parties. Id. at Tf9. Because this 
judgment was not considered a "pleading" pursuant to UT. R. Civ. P. 7(a), this Court 
determined that the trial court should have converted the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal into a 
Rule 56 summary judgment motion, with adequate notice and reasonable opportunity to 
respond accordingly given to the parties. Id. This Court determined that it was required 
to reverse the trial court's dismissal in Tuttle since "[n]either party knew until the end of 
the hearing that the trial court would grant what it termed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings." Id. at f 10. This Court stated that it could only affirm the trial court's 
dismissal if it found, independent of material submitted outside the pleadings, that the 
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. 
This position is in accordance with this Court's standard of review in this matter. 
"Whether the district court properly granted the motion to dismiss is 'a question of law, 
[which] we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial court.'" 
Gunn v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 2007 UT App. 4, ^6, 155 P.3d 113, citing Peterson v. 
Delta Air Lines. Inc.. 2002 UT App. 56, f7, 42 P.3d 1253. "We will only affirm a trial 
court's grant of a motion to dismiss ' "where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff 
would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support 
of its claims." ' " Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shores, 2006 UT 393, f 14, 147 P.3d 456, 
citing Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co.. 790 P.2d 107, 109-10 (Utah App. 1990)(quoting 
Arrow Indus. V. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). "In reviewing 
trial court order granting motion to dismiss for failure to state claim on which relief can 
be granted, appellate court must accept material allegations of complaint as true, and 
appellate court will affirm trial court's ruling only if it clearly appears complainant can 
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prove no set of facts in support of his or her claims." Sorensen v. Barbuto, 2006 UT App 
340,1(6, 143 P.3d 295. 
On May 24, 2007, Smith filed his Complaint in the above-captioned matter. In 
said Complaint, Smith alleged that, on or about June 6, 1999, the City initiated SID-98, 
which was a conglomeration of six (6) projects, each independent from the others and 
with the assessments within each project segregated and grouped according to the 
properties which purported to benefit from the work done within each project. See, 
Complaint at p. 2. One of the projects included in SID-98 was the flood control structure, 
the construction materials of which are at issue in this Inverse Action. Id. The flood 
control structure herein was designed and engineered by Bowen Collins & Associates, a 
Salt Lake City engineering firm hired by the City, and the estimated cost was in excess of 
two million dollars ($2,000,000.00). Id. 
Sometime during the Fall of 1999, the City entered into a contract for the 
construction of the flood control structure with Schmidt, who was the successful bidder 
of the project. Id. The contract identified the City as the owner of the real property 
where the flood control structure was to be built; however, the property was then owned 
by the Smith parties herein. Id. The contract provided that Schmidt could enter the 
property and construct the project using materials located on Smith's properties. Id. 
Schmidt was ultimately paid $819,361.15 on the contract, with total cost of the 
construction according to the City at $915,753.54 (including interest on interim 
warrants). Id. On April 24, 2001, the City enacted an ordinance assessing plaintiffs 
property. Id. The Complaint was timely and properly filed in accordance with the 
provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §17A3-330. 
Pursuant to this Court's holding in Sorensen, supra, the material allegations of the 
Complaint must be accepted by this Court as true in determining this issue. Ibid, at f6. 
The trial court ultimately determined that Smith was not entitled to compensation for the 
materials on the condemnation property since Smith had received compensation in the 
Condemnation Action for the property condemned, which would include any rock, dirt, 
etc. on the real estate. See, Addendum "A" at p. 3. This determination was based upon a 
judgment from a separate action involving the parties and the affidavit of Kit Wareham. 
Similar to Tuttle, supra, neither the judgment from the Condemnation Action nor the 
Wareham affidavit could be considered a "pleading" pursuant to UT. R. CIV. P. 7(a) and 
are thus matters "outside the pleadings" not appropriately determined under Rule 
12(b)(6) for dismissal. Having considered such in its determination, the trial court was 
required to properly convert the matter to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. 
The trial court additionally erroneously concluded that, as it pertained to the 
allegations in the Complaint as to materials taken from the property adjacent to the 
condemned property, Smith was required to present support by affidavit or citation to the 
record as to this argument. See, Addendum "A" at p. 3. Such evidentiary requirements 
are unnecessary in a dismissal motion, however, since the allegations contained in the 
Complaint are presumed true as it pertains to dismissals. See, Sorensen, supra. While 
such evidentiary requirements are necessary in a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, 
the trial court never undertook a conversion of the City's dismissal motion and failed to 
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properly put Smith on notice of such to allow adequate opportunity to present evidence 
accordingly. 
Similar to Turtle, the trial court herein waited until the entry of the Dismissal 
Order before notifying Smith that they were subjected to a summary judgment motion. 
Smith was not allowed adequate notice, opportunity to defend against a Rule 56 motion, 
nor even opportunity to object to such. The trial court improperly determined the matter 
under Rule 56 without undertaking the necessary conversion and notifying the parties. 
Hence, under this Court's prior holdings, it is required to reverse the dismissal absent 
independent finding that Smith has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. As argued further below, Smith has an actionable cause against the City in this 
matter and dismissal was inappropriate. 
B. Smith Has An Actionable Cause Against The City Due To The Fact 
That The SID Is Invalid As It Was Constructed On Private Property. 
UTAH CONST. ART. I § 22 states, "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged 
for public use without just compensation." The Utah Supreme Court held that, "[o]ur 
Constitution and statute require compensation to be first made for private property taken 
for public use; and, where property is entered upon and appropriated to public use 
without complying with the law, the owner may waive the tort and sue for his just 
compensation." Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 46 Utah 203, 148 P. 
439, 441, (Utah 1914.) "Under Utah law, a property owner may bring an inverse 
condemnation action whenever private property is taken or damaged for public use 
without a formal exercise of the State's eminent domain power." Bateman v. City of 
West Bountiful 89 F.3d 704, 708 C.A.10 (Utah),1996), citing Farmers New World Life 
v. Bountiful Citv. 803 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1990.) 
In State ex rel. State Road Commission v. District Court, the Court stated that 
"taking" is "any substantial interference with private property which destroys or 
materially lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and enjoyment is in 
any substantial degree abridged or destroyed." Ibid, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502, 506 
(1937) (quoting Stockdale v. Rio Grande Western Rv. Co., 28 Utah 201, 211, 77 P. 849, 
852 (1904); see Hampton v. State Road Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 342, 347, 445 P.2d 708, 
711-12 (1968). The Utah Supreme Court set forth the test for the standard of just 
compensation in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arthur, 10 Utah 2d 306, 352 P.2d 693 (1960): 
The standard of what is "just compensation" in the ordinary case is the 
market value of the property taken, that is what a willing buyer would pay 
to a willing seller. . . .Arthur recognized, however, that on occasion there is 
little or no possibility of sale on an open market, and consequently no 
market value in the usual sense of that term or more precisely by employing 
the usual test of a willing buyer and willing seller to determine market 
value. See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 122 Utah 431, 
250 P.2d 938 (1952). This Court in Arthur then stated the rule applicable to 
a situation where there is little or no possibility of open market sales as 
follows:. . . (I)ts value could be ascertained from the opinions of well-
informed persons as to what reasonable purchasers would be willing to pay 
for the property on the open market should they find it suitable for their 
purposes (Emphasis added.) 
Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. Utah Wool Pulling Co., 566 P.2d 1240, 1242, (Utah 1977.) 
Although the Smith deeded a portion of the property to the City in 2005, they 
continue to be the owners of the remaining portions of the property. In Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co v. SID No. 222 of Douglas County, 281 N.W. 2d 922 (1979) citing 
McQuillin Mun. Corp. s. 38.179(3rd ed.), it states, "It is beyond question that in order to 
17 
render an assessment for improvements valid, the improvements may be constructed only 
on land in which the public has title or at least a valid easement, citing McQuillin Mun. 
Corp. s. 38J79(3rd ed.) citing City of McCook v. Red Willow County, 133 Neb. 380, 
275 N.W. 396. See, also, 14 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.), s 38.179, p. 
448. 
In the instant matter, the City removed and used rocks and materials that were 
contained on the subject property to build the flood control structure. However, at the 
time of construction, the City had not commenced condemnation proceedings on the 
subject property and at the present time the City has still not commenced condemnation 
proceedings for the rocks and materials that were removed from the subject property. In 
order for the City to be entitled to the rocks and materials from the property they must 
commence a separate condemnation action for these materials. The rocks and materials 
were and still are private property of Smith as no condemnation proceedings have ever 
been commenced for the materials. In using the rocks to build the flood control structure, 
the City has violated Smith's rights under the Utah Constitution by taking private 
property without just compensation to Smith. As private property has been removed 
without just compensation Smith is within his right to sue for such compensation. 
In this matter, Smith has received no form of just compensation from the City for 
the rocks and materials that were removed from the subject property. As stated in the 
UTAH CONST. ART. I § 22, Smith is entitled to just compensation, to be determined under 
the standards mentioned supra, for the materials the City used and removed from the 
Smith's private property in the construction of the flood control structure. 
In his deposition, Nichols testified that he entered into a verbal agreement with 
Schmidt prior to the construction of the Structure. (Frank Nichols Deposition, pp. 75-76). 
Without an evidentiary hearing on this matter, the trial court could not have possibly 
ascertained that the City did not use any materials from Smith's property in the 
construction of the Structure. Clearly, the contradictory affidavits made by Nichols and 
Wareham warrant further inquiry by the trial court. Therefore, the trial court erred by 
granting the City's Motion to Dismiss and its Dismissal Order should be reversed. 
At the time the SID was constructed, it was on private property rendering it 
invalid. At the time the City built the Structure and used the material and rocks located 
on the Property and adjacent properties, no condemnation proceedings or condemnation 
action had commenced. The land was still private property at that time, owned by Smith. 
Since then, the Property has been deeded to the City under a mediation agreement in the 
Condemnation Action between the parties, however, the Condemnation Action has not 
yet concluded and does not include the materials taken in or before 2000 from the 
Property or the adjacent properties. No condemnation proceedings have commenced 
regarding the materials from the Property or the adjacent properties and therefore, those 
materials and rocks are still private property. 
Thus, the SID in this matter is void ab initio for having been constructed on 
private property. An SID built on private property, such as in the instant matter, is 
invalid. See, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v. SID No. 222 of DouglasCounty, 281 
19 
N.W. 2d 922 (1979) citing McQuillin Mun. Corp. s. 38.179 (3rd ed.). The Property was 
not owned by the City and the City had not commenced condemnation proceedings at the 
time the Structure was constructed. The City entered the Property without any color of 
title in either the materials or the Property upon which they were constructing the 
Structure. 
When improvements are performed to property for public use, special taxes and 
assessments are levied against the subject property to pay for the improvements in the 
district. See, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17A3-303(l)(a) In the instant matter, the City caused 
assessments to be made against property in the district, including Smith's adjacent 
properties, for a portion of the costs of the improvements. The materials used were not 
setoff against the assessments. In effect, the seizure of Smith's materials caused a levied 
assessment against the adjacent properties, which were not setoff for the value of the 
materials. 
Smith in his action for compensation of the materials utilized in the Structure, is 
entitled to a setoff for the value of the materials used before any further amount of tax is 
imposed. See, UTAH CODE ANN§ 78-34-9(4)(b). Therefore, the SID in this matter was 
not only invalid for being constructed on private property, but the assessment levied 
against the property for the SID failed to take into consideration the materials obtained 
from Smith for the construction of the flood structure. Smith's materials should be 
considered "payment in kind" for the SID assessments. Smith is entitled to a setoff of the 
SID assessments for the materials removed from the Property and adjacent properties in 
or before 2000, since said materials were, and still are, Smith's private property. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-10 states that, "[t]he court, jury or referee must hear 
such legal evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceedings, and 
thereupon must ascertain and assess: (1) the value of the property sought to be 
condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and 
every separate estate or interest therein; and if it consists of different parcels, the value of 
each parcel and of each estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed." As is 
stated in UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-10(1) the court must hear evidence in condemnation 
proceedings and assess the value of the property and any improvements made to the 
property and the court must do this separately for each estate or interest contained within 
the property. As it must be done for each interest in the property this includes materials 
located on the property. Therefore, it is the duty of the court to determine the value of the 
rocks and materials that were removed from Smith's private property to help construct 
the flood control structure and to determine the value of every parcel, material, or interest 
of property that is at issue in this action. 
The trial court erred by not proceeding to trial to resolve the evidentiary issue in 
this case. Nichols and Wareham both submitted affidavits to the trial court. As sworn to 
by Nichols in his affidavit, the same court in the above captioned case presided in the 
Condemnation Action, which judgment was understood not to include the materials being 
sued for in the instant case. {Affidavit of Frank Nichols, p. 3). Wareham's affidavit does 
not indicate anything on this point, but simply attempts to lay responsibility with Schmidt 
under a contract not provided to the trial court in this matter, and bar itself from liability 
under the same unknown provisions. Clearly, this conveyed a need for the trial court to 
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inquire further so as to ascertain the truth of the matter. {Affidavit of Kit Wareham, pp. 1-
2). 
The trial court in its Dismissal Order stated that Smith's response to the City's 
Motion to Dismiss Smith included a Statement of Facts "unsupported by any affidavit or 
citation to the record." (Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 2). However, 
in Smith's reply to the City's Motion to Dismiss, an affidavit accompanying it from 
Nichols clearly supports its Statement of Facts, which is directly in line with responding 
to a dismissal motion. (Affidavit of Frank Nichols, pp. 1-4.) The trial court should have 
proceeded to trial or converted the matter to a motion for summary judgment so as to 
weigh the affidavits and credibility of the conflicting witnesses. Therefore, the trial court 
erred in granting the City's Motion to Dismiss based upon the fact that Smith maintained 
an actionable cause against the City for inverse condemnation and its Dismissal Order 
should be reversed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED SMITH'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 
UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS BY FIRST 
DENYING A MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE THE CASE WITH A SEPARATE 
CAUSE PERTAINING TO THE REAL PROPERTY, THEN DETERMINING 
THE UNDERLYING ISSUE BASED UPON THE DETERMINATION IN THAT 
SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION 
UT. CONST. ART. I § 7 states, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." UT. R. CIV. P. 42 sets forth as follows: 
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or 
fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any 
or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions 
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein 
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay, (a)(1) A motion to 
consolidate cases shall be heard by the judge assigned to the first case filed. 
Notice of a motion to consolidate cases shall be given to all parties in each 
case. The order denying or granting the motion shall be filed in each case. 
(a)(2) If a motion to consolidate is granted, the case number of the first case 
filed shall be used for all subsequent papers and the case shall be heard by 
the judge assigned to the first case. The presiding judge may assign the case 
to another judge for good cause, (b) Separate trials. The court in furtherance 
of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any 
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate 
issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party 
claims, or issues. 
"Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives trial courts discretion to bifurcate 
proceedings in appropriate situations." Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30,f 7, 996 P.2d 
565. See UT. R. CIV. P. 42. The Utah Supreme Court has determined the following: 
Rule 42(b) permits a trial court, "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid 
prejudice," to order a separate trial of "any claim" or "any separate issue." 
Regardless of convenience, however, an order to bifurcate trial "is an abuse 
of discretion if it is unfair or prejudicial to a party" or if "the issues are 
[not] clearly separable." Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., 11 F.3d 957, 
964 (10th Cir.1993) (interpreting Fed.R.Civ.P. 42, which is identical to the 
Utah rule). 
Walker Drug Co.. Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah 1998). Cases can be 
consolidated when they "involv[e] a common question of law or fact." Sullivan v. 
Sullivan. 2004 UT App 485, % 11, 105 P.3d 963. 
In both the Condemnation Action and the Inverse Action, the parties and the issues 
were pertaining to the materials and the property itself that was condemned in the 
Condemnation Action. Both actions resulted from the City taking private property and 
using such property to construct the same structure. The outcome of the Condemnation 
Action was relied upon by this Court in adjudicating the Inverse Action in its Dismissal 
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Order, claiming that Smith had receive compensation for the materials taken from the 
condemned property in the separate Condemnation Action. 
The Dismissal Order from which Smith now appeals states in pertinent part: 
The Plaintiffs claim for compensation for materials located on the 
condemned property and used in the project is denied as failing to state a 
claim for which relief may be granted, Plaintiffs having obtained a 
decision in the condemnation proceeding and the court having fixed the 
value of the property condemned, which would include any rock, dirt, etc. 
on the real estate. 
{Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, p. 3). With this Dismissal Order in 
place, Smith is placed at a disadvantage. Throughout the Condemnation Action (which 
not only involved the same parties but also the same trial judge), Smith's counsel re-
iterated to the trial court that the Condemnation Action was solely for the value of the 
real estate, not the materials, which were being sued for in the instant case. {See, Affidavit 
of Frank Nichols, p. 2-3). Furthermore, in the instant case, no notice or argument was 
given that the materials were being included in the Condemnation Action. Therefore, 
Smith was not on notice to defend against the outcome of the Condemnation Action as it 
pertains to the materials taken from said property2. Given the trial court's reliance upon 
the outcome of the Condemnation Action five (5) months following entry of the order 
from said action, Smith was without recourse to appeal the underlying Condemnation 
Action in order to defend against the contentions in this action that it included the 
2
 Neither the arguments made at the trial on the Condemnation Action nor the judgment from said action indicated 
to Smith that the compensation ordered therein was for the materials contained on the property. In fact, the judge 
refused to hear any evidence pertaining to the materials until compensation for the property itself was determined. 
The parties in the Condemnation Action put on only evidence pertaining to valuation of the property, not the 
materials taken from the property. 
materials taken therefrom in construction of the structure. Such action by the trial court 
has severely prejudiced Smith's Due Process rights in this matter. 
The trial court inappropriately relied upon the decision in the Condemnation 
Action in its Dismissal Order in the instant case, particularly given its refusal in the 
Condemnation Action to hear matters pertaining to the materials and its refusal to 
consolidate the cases. When coupled with the trial court's reiteration throughout the trial 
in the Condemnation Action that it was only considering the real property and not the 
materials, the trial court's Dismissal Order has prejudiced Smith. Ultimately, this 
Dismissal Order violates Smith's right to due process under the United States and Utah 
Constitutions in that Smith was neither put on notice to defend against the Condemnation 
Action in this proceeding. 
Both the City and Smith indicated to the trial court that they wished to consolidate 
the instant matter with the Condemnation Action (Minutes Review Hearing, June 2, 2004, 
p. 1). In the docket for the Inverse Action, it is clear that this action trailed the 
Condemnation Action and was waiting for a determination to be made in that case. 
(Minutes Review Hearing, July 19, 2005, p.l; Minutes Status Hearing, March 8, 2005, p. 
I; Minutes Status Hearing, May 10, 2005, p.l; Minutes Order to Show Cause, August 26, 
2003, p. 1). Based on the record, it is apparent that, although the trial court did not see fit 
to consolidate the cases, it still relied on the outcome of the Condemnation Action to 
issue its Dismissal Order in the Inverse Action. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY RELYING ON 
WAREHAM'S AFFIDAVIT IN ITS DISMISSAL ORDER WHEN SAID 
AFFIDAVIT RELIED ON A CONTRACT NOT IN EVIDENCE. 
This Court may take notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights. State v. 
Hall 946 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App. 1997) citing State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 
1989) (quotations omitted). To establish plain error, defendant must show that, "(0 t a ] n 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). "If any one of these 
requirements is not met, plain error is not established." Id. at 1209. UTAH R. EVIDENCE 
103(d) states, "[n]othing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting 
substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court." 
UT. R. EVID. 1002 states that, "[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or 
photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as 
otherwise provided in these rules or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of this 
State or by Statute." (Emphasis added.) Rule 1002 has frequently been referred to as the 
"best evidence rule" by this and other courts. See, Gorostieta v. Parkinson, 2000 UT 99, 
17 P.3d 1110. The Utah Supreme Court explained the rule's purpose as follows: 
The purpose of the best evidence rule is primarily to prevent mistake or 
fraud. Citing 29A Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1049, at 511 (1994); 32A C.J.S. 
Evidence § 1061 (1996); 6 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 
Wienstein's Federal Evidence § 1002.03 (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed. 
Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997); 4 Wigmore on Evidence § 1179, at 417 
(James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. 1972). Therefore, when the content of a 
document is material to the matter to be proved, the original writing must 
be produced unless it is unavailable due to an exception and its absence is 
not attributable to the fault of the party seeking to use it as proof of the 
contents therein. See Am.Jur.2d supra, § 1049, at 510; C.J.S. supra, §§ 
1057, 1059. 
Id. atfl37-38. 
On October 3, 2006, Wareham swore in an affidavit that he contracted with 
Schmidt to construct the SID in the instant matter. Affidavit of Kit Wareham, Cedar City 
Engineer, p. 1. Schmidt was hired to construct the Structure within the SID. Id. The 
construction of the Structure required rip-rap lining of the Structure's channel and rock 
lining for the dam and basin. Id. at 2. Wareham swore that the contract with Schmidt 
required Schmidt to provide the rock and other materials needed to construct the 
Structure and that, to the best of his knowledge, Schmidt did so. Id. 
In the Dismissal Order in this matter, the trial court acknowledged the filing of the 
motion to strike and the responses thereto, indicating that the City had supported its 
position with the Wareham9s affidavit. See, Dismissal Order at pp. 2-3. Specifically, the 
trial court indicated that, ". . .Wareham claims that the contractor on the project was 
obligated to provide the materials and, in fact, did provide 'all the rocks used as materials 
in the project that were not removed from the approximately 7.5 acre flood control basin 
constructed as part of the project.' That claim is unrebutted by any affidavit or citation to 
the record except the allegations of the Complaint and Plaintiffs' arguments against 
dismissal." Id. at p. 3. The trial court then denied the claim respecting compensation for 
materials located on the condemned property as failing to state a claim for which relief 
may be granted, referencing Smith's compensation in the Condemnation Action as 
inclusive of the materials taken from the condemned property. Id. As it pertained to 
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materials taken from adjacent properties, the trial court found that the claim was 
unsupported by any affidavit or citation to the record, stating that ". . .Plaintiffs may not 
simply rely on the allegations in their complaint or their argument, unsupported by any 
affidavit or citation to the record, in opposing Defendant's motion for summary 
judgement [sic] as to that claim." Id. The trial court then granted "Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment of dismissal" as to the materials removed from adjacent property 
and dismissed the claim. Id. 
In the instant case, the trial court committed plain error relying upon the 
submission of Wareham's affidavit with the City's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Strike. (Record, Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's 
Motion to Strike, pp. 1-6). Wareham's affidavit relies on a contract that has not been 
submitted into evidence and is not in the record. The trial court, in issuing the Dismissal 
Order, cannot rely on a contract not in the record nor can it require Smith to rebut it 
absent proof that it exists and that the terms as interpreted by Wareham are correct. The 
City should have been required to produce the contract in support of Wareham's 
affidavit. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the City's Motion to Dismiss and its 
Dismissal Order should be reversed. 
Furthermore, the error exists due to the trial court relying on an affidavit that in 
turn relied on a contract not in evidence or included in the record. Dunn at 1208. There is 
no evidence pertaining to this matter in the record other than Wareham's affidavit, so this 
Court is not in a position to be able to rely upon Wareham's interpretation of its 
provisions in its independent review. This error should have been obvious to the trial 
court due to the fact that Wareham swore to the terms of a contract that the trial court did 
not have in its possession to review personally. Id. In a situation where the City was 
attempting to place their liability on Schmidt pursuant to a contract between the City and 
Schmidt, a motion to join an indispensible party to the action would have been the 
appropriate avenue to take rather than just boldly attesting to the provisions of a contract 
and claiming that someone else is liable. The error is harmful because the Inverse Action 
would have succeeded on its merits had the proceedings continued. Id. Therefore, the 
Dismissal Order should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon die foregoing, Smith respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Dismissal Order in this matter and take any such further action as this Court 
deems necessary. 
DATED this >H uf Jk&ayJxo 2007. 
William L. Bernard 
Attorney for David J. Smith 
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ADDENDUM ~A~ 
Ordering Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 
dated April 14, 2007 
PILED 
APR1 •mh 
^iSSS0 7" COURT 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COVRJ^JP^kgOUNTY' 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IRON, STATE O F U T A i r ^ DeP"ty Clerk 
ESTATE OF SALLIE SMITH et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CEDAR CITY, A MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 010500355 
JUDGE: G. MICHAEL WESTFALL 
On or about May 24, 2001 Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a Complaint in 
which three causes of action are asserted against the Defendant. In their first cause of 
action the Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to be compensated for property 
condemned on which a flood control project was constructed and for materials used by 
Defendant in the construction of that flood control project. They seek to have the amount 
to which they claim entitlement under that cause of action set off as a credit against the 
Defendant's special improvement district assessment for their property. Elsewhere in the 
Complaint the Plaintiffs claim that the materials used in the construction of the project 
were taken from "the [Plaintiffs'] property." (Paragraph 8 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint) 
While Plaintiffs' property includes the property where the project was constructed, 
Plaintiffs' property also includes adjacent land. Therefore, the First Cause of Action of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint includes a claim for materials taken from the property condemned in 
Case No. 010500168 and property taken from adjacent property as well. 
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The Plaintiffs' Second and Third Causes of Action, challenging the special 
improvement assessment, were dismissed by agreement of the parties in an Order entered 
June 9,2006. 
In their Trial Brief, filed July 31, 2006, Plaintiffs identify their claims against 
Defendant as, among things, claims for materials taken from the condemned property and 
from the "surrounding areas." Plaintiffs also argue that the special improvement district is 
invalid. 
Defendant filed a "Response to Plaintiffs' Trial Brief and Motion to Dismiss" on 
August 25, 2006. In that Motion Defendant argues that the Plaintiffs should not be 
compensated for the materials on the real property in addition to the value of the real 
property condemned, that Plaintiffs challenge to the special improvement district should 
be dismissed because the Plaintiffs have not alleged compliance with the requirements for 
challenge to that special improvement district and that the Plaintiffs claims should be 
dismissed because of estoppel, claim preclusion and issue preclusion. It would appear that 
the Defendant intends to have this considered a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim as to part of this proceeding and a motion for summary judgement as to others. 
Plaintiffs filed a response to the Defendant's Motion on September 12, 2006, and 
included a Statement of Facts unsupported by any affidavit or citation to the record. 
Defendant moved to strike portions of that Statement of Facts, to which Plaintiffs filed a 
response. 
On October 3, 2006 the Defendant filed a Reply relating to the Motion to Strike, and 
supports that Reply with the Affidavit of Kit Wareham, Cedar City Engineer, in which 
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Mr. Wareham claims that the contractor on the project was obligated to provide the 
materials and, in fact, did provide "all of the rocks used as material in the project that 
were not removed from the approximately 7.5 acre flood control basin constructed as part 
of the project." That claim is unrebutted by any affidavit or citation to the record except 
the allegations of the Complaint and Plaintiffs' arguments against dismissal. 
The Plaintiffs' claim to compensation for materials located on the condemned 
property and used in the project is denied as failing to state a claim for which relief may 
be granted, Plaintiffs having obtained a decision in the condemnation proceeding and the 
court having fixed the value of the property condemned, which would include any rock, 
dirt, etc. on the real estate. 
Although Plaintiffs claim that materials were taken from real estate adjacent to the 
condemned property, that claim is unsupported by any affidavit or citation to the record. 
Plaintiffs may not simply rely on the allegations in their complaint or their argument, 
unsupported by any affidavit or citation to the record, in opposing Defendant's motion for 
summary judgement as to that claim. Therefore, Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment of dismissal as to Plaintiffs for materials removed from property adjacent to the 
condemned property, is granted and this claim is dismissed. 
Plaintiffs argue that the special improvement district is invalid. The court was of the 
impression that challenges to the validity of the special improvement district were 
resolved by the Order entered June 9, 2006. However, neither party has cited that Order 
for that proposition so the court will consider Plaintiffs' claims in that regard. 
The court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs' challenge to the 
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special improvement district assessment because the Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to allege 
compliance with the statutory provisions cited by the Defendant. 
The court having granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for the reasons stated 
hereinabove, the court does not address the remaining arguments in the Defendant's 
Motion. 
DATED this 14th day of April, 2007. 
I hereby certify that on the j i ^ day of 2007 a copy of 
the attached document was sent to the following people for case 010500355 by mail, U S 
postage prepaid. 
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